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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an efficient fair document exchange protocol. The exchange of the documents will 
be between two parties. The protocol is based on the verifiable and recoverable encryption of a 
document’s key. This verifiable and recoverable encryption of the document’s key will allow one party 
to verify the encrypted key. It will also ensure this party that the Semi Trusted Third Party will be able to 
recover the key if the other party misbehaves. The protocol also incorporates the concept of enforcing 
the honesty of one party. The proposed protocol consists of only three messages and is more efficient 
than related protocols. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Individuals and businesses are relying on the Internet for conducting different types of 
transactions. One of these transactions is the exchange of valuable documents (such as 
electronic payment and products) between the parties. That is, party A will exchange its 
valuable document for party B’s valuable document. As an example of such an exchange, party 
A would like to buy an electronic product (e-product such as computer game) from party B. As 
parties using communication networks, they cannot send their documents at the same time. 
Rather, one party sends its document at a time. After receiving the document of the first party, 
the second party sends its document. 
There are risks associated with such exchange. One of the most important risks is the case 
where party A sends its document to party B but the later either disappears before sending its 
document to party A or sends an incorrect document. Therefore, party A will be the loser in 
this scenario because the party who sends its document first will be at risk. This problem is 
known as the fairness problem. The fairness problem is solved using fair exchange protocols 
that ensure the fair exchange of documents between the parties involved. That is, fair exchange 
protocols will ensure that either both parties get each other's item or none do. 
The contribution of this paper is that it applies the concept of enforcing the honesty of one 
party to the verifiable and recoverable encryption of a document’s key proposed by Zhang et al 
[12]. The result of this application is a new optimized fair document exchange protocol as will 
be shown in the comparison in section 5.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will be discussing the literature survey. Section 3 
will present the new protocol. The analysis of the proposed protocol and comparison will be 
discussed in sections 4 and 5, respectively. 
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2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
A number of fair exchange protocols have been proposed in the literature 
[1,2,3,4,7,9,10,11,12,14, 19]. These protocols are either based on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
or gradual exchange protocols. The gradual exchange protocols [10] allow the parties to 
exchange their items without involvement of any other party. The TTP-based protocols require 
a TTP to be involved. The involvement of the TTP can be either online such as in [7, 9, 17] or 
offline such as in [1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 19]. The online TTP must be available during the 
exchange of items between parties because one of the parties (or all of the parties involved) 
will use it either for verification purposes or downloading items. The offline TTP will not be 
involved during the exchange of items between parties. Rather, it will be contacted in case one 
party misbehaves.  
The fair exchange protocols can be used to exchange any two items between two (or more) 
parties. The items can be valuable documents, a document and payment, two digital signatures 
on a contract, and an email with a receipt. The focus in this paper is on fair exchange protocols 
that are for the exchange of two valuable documents between two parties.  
Zhang et al [12] proposed a fair document exchange protocol between two parties A and B. 
The protocol is based on the verifiable and recoverable encryption of keys. Parties A and B 
will first exchange their encrypted documents in the first two messages. Then, the parties will 
exchange the decryption keys to decrypt the encrypted documents. If one party misbehaves, 
the offline STTP (Semi Trusted Third Party that will not collude with any party but may 
misbehave by itself) can be contacted to recover the key. To start the protocol, party A will 
send its encrypted document to party B. Party B will then verify the correctness of the 
encrypted document. If it is correct, then party B will send the following to party A: (a) its 
encrypted document, (b) verifiable and recoverable encryption of the key that encrypts the 
document, and (c) the authorization token. Party A will then verify the correctness of the 
encrypted document, authorization token and the encrypted key. If these verifications are 
correct, then it is safe for party A to send its decryption key to party B. Finally, once party B 
decrypted the document, it sends its decryption key to party A. If party B misbehaves by either 
sending an incorrect decryption key or not sending the decryption key to party A, then party A 
can contact the STTP to recover the decryption key.  
Ray et al [7] proposed a fair exchange protocol for the exchange of documents (e.g. digital 
products and payments between customers and merchants). The protocol is based on cross 
validation theorem that states [7] “if a message is encrypted with the product key of two 
compatible keys and another message is encrypted with either of the two compatible keys and 
the two encrypted messages compare, then the two original unencrypted messages must also 
compare”.  
In the protocol, a merchant M exchanges a digital product for a payment from a customer C. 
Before the protocol starts, the merchant (M) needs to register with a trusted third party (TTP). 
The TTP generates the key pair KM1 and KM1-1. The TTP then provides M with KM1 and 
keeps KM1-1 with itself. C needs to have an account in a bank. The bank generates the key 
pairs KC1 and KC1-1. The bank then provides C with KC1 and keeps KC1-1 with itself. M needs 
to send the digital product, its description and its price to the TTP. The TTP encrypts the 
digital product using the key KM1 and then advertises it on its website. C needs to download 
the encrypted digital product from the TTP.  
The exchange part of Ray et al protocol [7] consists of four messages. C sends to M the first 
message that includes the purchase order and the payment that is encrypted with the product 
key of (KC1 x KC2). Then, M sends the second message to C. The second message includes the 
digital product that is encrypted with the product key of (KM1 x KM2). On receiving the 
second message, C compares the hash value of the encrypted digital product that was 
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downloaded from the TTP with the hash value of the encrypted digital product that is included 
in the second message. If the two hash values are matched then C can be sure that the 
unencrypted digital products will be matched as well. After verifying that the two hashes are 
compared, C sends the third message to M. The third message includes the decryption key for 
the encrypted payment. Finally, M sends the fourth message to C which includes the 
decryption key of the encrypted digital product. If M misbehaves, C contacts the TTP for the 
recovery of the decryption key of the digital product. 
Alaraj and Munro [1] proposed a fair exchange protocol for the exchange of two documents 
(the two documents can be a digital product and payment) between a customer and a merchant. 
Alaraj and Munro proposed a new design approach for the exchange. They call it enforcing the 
customer to be honest. The protocol works as follows. The merchant starts the protocol by 
sending the first message to the customer. The first message includes the merchant’s document 
encrypted with a key. This key is also encrypted using a shared public key between the 
merchant and the TTP. On receiving the first message, the customer will verify the encrypted 
document and the encrypted key. If they are correctly verified then the customer will send the 
second message to the merchant. The second message includes the customer’s document 
encrypted with a key that was sent to the customer by the merchant in the first message. On 
receiving the second message, the merchant will use the key that it already has to decrypt the 
customer’s document. When the document is decrypted correctly, the merchant will send the 
decryption key to the customer. If the merchant refuses to send the decryption key, the 
customer can contact the TTP to send the decryption key to the customer. This approach is 
called enforcing the customer to be honest because the customer can not cheat by sending an 
incorrect document because they are going to encrypt their document using a key that the 
merchant already has. Using this approach, Alaraj and Munro [1] were able to propose a fair 
exchange protocol using only three messages. 
Alaraj and Munro [3] proposed a protocol that is similar to the protocol in [1]. The difference 
is that the merchant is the one who is enforced to be honest in [3]. 
The design approach of most of the protocols proposed in the literature, apart from Alaraj and 
Munro [1, 3], is to include at least four messages in the exchange protocol. The first two 
messages are for the exchange of the encrypted items between the participating parties. The 
last two messages are for the exchange of decryption keys to decrypt the items received in the 
first two messages. The design approach of Alaraj and Munro [1, 3] is to have only three 
messages in the protocol. The first message includes the encrypted item of the first party. The 
other party will be able to verify it and if it is correctly verified then they will send the second 
message to the first party. The second message includes the encrypted item of the second party 
but the first party will be able to decrypt it as it is encrypted with a key that the first party 
already has. Therefore, the second party has to send a correct item in order to receive the 
decryption key of the first party’s item in the third message. Therefore, the design approach of 
Alaraj and Munro protocols [1, 3] is based on the exchange of an item (i.e. that is included in 
the second message) for a decryption key (i.e. that is included in the third message). The result 
is to have more efficient protocol that includes only three messages. 
The proposed protocol in this paper uses the concept of having one party to be enforced to be 
honest to reduce the number of messages. Moreover, the concept of verifiable and recoverable 
encryption of keys is also used. Therefore, more efficient protocol is proposed. 
3. THE DOCUMENT EXCHANGE PROTOCOL 
3.1 Notations 
The following represents the notations used in the proposed protocol: 
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• Pa: party a 
• Pb: party b 
• STTP: Semi Trusted Third Party is a party neither Pa nor Pb. STTP will not collude with 
any other party but may misbehave by itself 
• h(X): a strong-collision-resistant one-way hash function, such as SHA-1 [13] 
• pkx = (ex, nx): RSA Public Key [16] of the party x, where nx is a public RSA modulus and 
ex is a public exponent 
• skx = (dx, nx): RSA Private Key [16] of the party x, where nx is a public RSA modulus and 
dx is a private exponent 
• Dx: the document of party x 
• kx: a symmetric key that will be used for encryption and decryption of a document 
• C.bt: the certificate for the shared public key between Pb and the STTP. C.bt is issued by 
the STTP. A standard X.509 certificate [15] can be used to implement C.bt  
• enc.pkx(Y): an RSA [16] encryption of Y using the public key pkx (ex, nx). The encryption 
of Y is computed as follows. enc.pkx(Y) = Yex mod nx 
• enc.skx(Z): an RSA [16] decryption of Z using the private key skx (dx, nx). The decryption 
of Z is computed as follows. enc.skx(Z) = Zdx mod nx 
• enc.kx(Y) : encryption of Y using a symmetric key kx (kx can be used for decrypting 
enc.kx(Y)) 
• Sig.a (X): the RSA digital signature [16] of the party a on X. The digital signature of party 
a on X is computed by encrypting the hash value of X using the private key ska (da, na). 
This is computed as follows. Sig.a (X) = (h(x))da mod na  
• A → B: X: A sends message X to B 
• X + Y: concatenation of X and Y 
• heDx: hash value of encrypted Dx using kx 
3.2 Assumptions 
The following represents the assumptions made for the proposed protocol: 
 
• Each party (Pb, Pa and STTP) has its own public and private keys.  
o The STTP’s public key is denoted as pkt = (et, nt) and its corresponding private 
key is denoted as skt = (dt, nt).  
o Pb’s public key is denoted as pkb = (eb, nb) and its corresponding private key is 
denoted as skb = (db, nb).  
o Pa’s public key is denoted as pka = (ea, na) and its corresponding private key is 
denoted as ska = (da, na). 
• Pb has a RSA-based public-key certificate C.bt = (Pb, pkbt, Wbt, Sig.t) issued by STTP 
[12]. The content of C.bt is described as follows. 
o Pb in C.bt is Pb’s identity to make C.bt valid only for Pb.  
o The public key pkbt and its associated private key skbt are denoted as pkbt = 
(ebt, nbt) and skbt = (dbt, nbt), respectively, where nbt is a product of two distinct 
large primes chosen randomly by STTP. This pair of keys needs to be 
produced in relation to Pb’s public key pkb = (eb, nb) so that ebt = eb and nbt > nb 
[12]. STTP does not allow any other party, including Pb, to know skbt, and it 
sends only C.bt to Pb. One C.bt certificate will be issued for Pb, and Pb can use 
C.bt for as many document exchanges as Pb wishes [12] 
o Wbt in C.bt is defined as Wbt = (h(skt + pkbt) -1 * dbt) mod nbt, where skt is 
STTP’s private key, and h(skt + pkbt) -1 is the multiplicative inverse of h(skt + 
pkbt) modulo nbt,  
i.e. h(skt + pkbt) -1  h(skt + pkbt) mod nbt = 1.  
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Wbt is included in C.bt in order to eliminate the need for STTP to store and 
safe-keep private key skbt [12]. Therefore, STTP will compute it from Wbt, i.e. 
dbt = (h(skt + pkbt) Wbt) mod nbt  
o Sig.t in C.bt is STTP’s RSA signature on h(Pb, pkbt, Wbt), i.e. Sig.t=enc.skt(h(Pb 
+ pkbt + Wbt))  
• The following is known to Pb before the exchange protocol is executed: 
o heDa = h(enc.ka(Da)) which is the hash value of encrypted Da with ka 
• The following is known to Pa before the exchange protocol is executed: 
o ekb = enc.pkb(kb) which is the encryption of kb with the public key of Pb 
 
 
3.3 Protocol description 
Semi Trusted Third Party (STTP) will be used in the proposed protocol. The STTP may 
misbehave but it will not collude with any other party involved in the exchange [18]. 
The idea of the proposed protocol is to have one party (Pb) sends its first message to the other 
party (Pa). The first message includes the encrypted document, verifiable and recoverable 
encryption of Pb’s key (this key is used to encrypt Pb’s document) and the authorization token. 
The verifiable and recoverable encryption of Pb’s key allows Pa to verify it and if it is correct 
then Pa can be sure that STTP will be able to recover the key in case Pb does not sends it i.e. if 
Pb misbehaves. So, when Pa verifies this verifiable and recoverable encryption correctly then Pa 
will send its message that contains its encrypted document using a key that was sent to Pa by 
Pb. Then, Pa will wait for the third message from Pb that includes the decryption key for the 
encrypted document received in the first message. If Pb did not send the third message then Pa 
will contact STTP to recover the key. The STTP will verify the authorization token generated 
by Pb to make sure that Pa provided what Pb wants.  
Therefore, for Pb to produce this verifiable and recoverable encryption of Pb’s key kb, Pb 
chooses a large prime rb relatively prime to nb in Pb’s public key pkb=(eb, nb) and then 
computes the following [12]: 
    Xb= rb*kb, where chosen rb needs to ensure that xb <nb 
    Yb= rbeb mod (nb * nbt), with key pkbt =(ebt, nbt) and nb<nbt 
    Zb= kbeb mod (nb * nbt) 
 
 Xb, Yb and Zb form the verifiable and recoverable encryption of Pb’s key kb. Note that Yb can 
be decrypted using either skb or skbt [7]. Therefore, either Pb or STTP can recover rb. 
The Pb’s authorization token will be defined by Pb. Pb’s authorization token represents Pb’s 
RSA signature on h(C.bt+Yb+Ya+Pa) [12]. That is, Sb= skb(h(C.bt + Yb + Ya + Pa)),where: 
  
    Ya = h(enc.ka(Da)), this Ya is specified by Pb.  
 
The authorization Sb represents Pb’s conditional authorization stating that STTP can recover rb 
from Yb (which will enable Pa to derive kb from Xb) if and only if Pa provides an item “i.e. 
enc.ka(Da)” for STTP such that h(enc.ka(Da))=Ya. STTP will verify this Sb and if it is correct 
then STTP can be sure that this “enc.ka(Da)” is the one that Pb is looking for. 
Therefore, the verifiable and recoverable encryption of key “kb” will be generated by Pb, it will 
be verified by Pa, and it will be recovered by STTP. 
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3.4 Exchange Protocol 
       
 
 
Figure 1: Exchange phase of the protocol 
Pb will start the exchange protocol by sending the first message E-M1 to Pa. The contents of E-
M1 are as follows: 
 
 
E-M1: Pb → Pa: enc.kb(Db) + C.bt + enc.pka(Xb + Zb) + Yb + Sb + enc.pka(ka) 
 
The description of the contents of E-M1 is as follows: 
 
• enc.kb(Db) is the encryption of Pb’s document Db using kb 
• C.bt is RSA-based public-key certificate that is discussed in section 3.2  
• enc.pka(Xb + Zb) is the encryption of Xb and Zb using Pa’s public key pka.  
• Yb 
• Sb 
• enc.pka(ka) is the encryption of ka using the public key of Pa. ka will later be used by Pa 
to encrypt its document Da. ka is chosen by Pb and will be sent to Pa to use it for 
encrypting its document Da 
 
On receiving the first message (E-M1), Pa will make the following verifications [12]: 
  
1. Verifying the correctness of Sb. This is done by decrypting Sb using Pb’ public key pkb 
to get the hash value included in the signature. Then, computing the hash value of 
(C.bt+Yb+Ya+Pa). If the two hash values match then Sb is correct. 
2. Verifying the correctness of C.bt = (Pb, pkbt, Wbt, Sig.t) by decrypting Sig.t using 
STTP’s public key pkt to get the hash value included in the signature. Then, 
computing the hash value of (Pb, pkbt, Wbt). If the two hash values match then C.bt is 
correct. 
3. Compute the hash value of enc.kb(Db) and then compare it with heDb. If the two hash 
values match then Pa is sure that the encrypted Db is the one that Pa is looking for 
4. Confirm that Xb < nb, and Zb mod nb= enc.pkb(kb). It is assumed that enc.pkb(kb) is 
known to Pa (section 3.2) 
5. Confirm that Xbeb mod nb = (Yb * enc.pkb(kb)) mod nb 
6. Confirm that Xbeb mod nbt = (Yb * Zb) mod nbt 
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If all verifications above are correct then it is secure for Pa to send its document Da that is 
encrypted with a key that Pb already has. Otherwise, Pa terminated the protocol. So, if all 
verifications are correct then Pa will send the second message (E-M2) to Pb as follows: 
 
E-M2: Pa → Pb: enc.ka(Da) 
 
The description of the contents of E-M2 is as follows: 
 
• enc.ka(Da) is the encryption of Pa’s document using ka. ka was sent to Pa in E-M1 
 
On receiving E-M2, Pb will do the following: 
 
• Compute the hash value of enc.ka(Da) then compare it with heDa (it is assumed that 
heDa is known to Pb , section 3.2) 
 
If the above verification is correct then Pb will decrypt Da using ka (note that, ka is already 
known to Pb). Then, Pb will send E-M3 to Pa as follows: 
 
E-M3: Pb → Pa: rb 
 
On receiving E-M3, Pa will compute kb as follows: 
kb = Xb/rb 
 
Then, Pa will use the key kb to decrypt enc.kb(Db) to retrieve Db. 
At this step, both Pa and Pb have each other’s documents i.e. they have fairly exchanged their 
documents. 
 
3.5 Dispute Resolution Protocol (Key recovery protocol) 
 
 
Figure 2: Dispute Resolution Phase of the Protocol 
 
In the case of dispute (where Pb misbehaves by either sending incorrect E-M3 or not sending 
E-M3 at all), Pa will initiate the dispute resolution protocol by sending the message DR-M1 to 
the STTP as follows. 
 
DR-M1: Pa → STTP: C.bt + enc.ka(Da) + Yb + Sb  
On receiving the message DR-M1 from Pa, STTP will do the following verifications: 
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1. Verifying the correctness of Sb. This is done by decrypting Sb using Pb’ public key pkb 
to get the hash value included in the signature. Then, computing the hash value of 
(C.bt+Yb+Ya+Pa). If the two hash values match then Sb is correct. 
2. Verifying the correctness of C.bt = (Pb, pkbt, Wbt, Sig.t) by decrypting Sig.t using 
STTP’s public key pkt to get the hash value included in the signature. Then, 
computing the hash value of (Pb, pkbt, Wbt). If the two hash values match then C.bt is 
correct 
3. Compute the hash value of enc.ka(Da) and then compare it with Ya (Ya includes the 
hash value of enc.ka(Da)). 
 
If any of the verifications above is incorrect then STTP will send an error message to Pa. 
Otherwise, if all verifications are correct then STTP will calculate rb from Yb. Therefore, STTP 
needs to decrypt Yb using the shared private key i.e. skbt. So, STTP needs first to retrieve skbt 
from C.bt as discussed in section 3.2. After decrypting Yb and getting rb from it, STTP will send 
the following two messages. 
 
DR-M2: STTP → Pb: enc.ka(Da) 
 
On receiving DR-M2 from STTP, Pb will compute the hash value of enc.ka(Da) then compare it 
with heDa. If the two hash values match then Pb will get Da by decrypting enc.ka(Da) using ka 
that Pb already has.  
 
 
DR-M3: STTP → Pa: rb 
 
On receiving DR-M3 from STTP, Pa will compute kb as follows: 
kb = Xb/rb 
 
Then, Pa will use the key kb to decrypt enc.kb(Db) to retrieve Db. 
  
At this step, both Pa and Pb have each other’s items and hence the fairness is ensured. 
 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the security of the verifiable and recoverable encryption of Pb’s key kb is the 
same analysis conducted in [12]. Therefore, readers are referred to Zhang et al [12]. 
  
The following discusses all scenarios of the protocol’s messages E-M1, EM2, E-M3 and DR-
M1. 
 
All possible scenarios of E-M1 will be studied as follows. 
 
• Pb sends incorrect E-M1 to Pa. If so, Pa will find that E-M1 is incorrect when Pa makes 
the verifications (these verifications discussed in sections 3.4). So, if E-M1 is incorrect 
then Pa will not send E-M2 to Pb.  
• Pb sends correct E-M1 to Pa. After Pa makes sure that E-M1 is correct by applying the 
verifications (these verifications discussed in sections 3.4) it is Pa’s choice to complete 
the exchange by sending E-M2 to Pb. However, if Pa decides to complete the exchange 
then Pa is enforced to be honest i.e. Pa has to send correct E-M2 to be able to receive 
E-M3 from Pb. 
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All possible scenarios of E-M2 will be studied as follows. 
  
• Pa sends to Pb in E-M2: enc.ka(Da) where ka used is the key sent to Pa by Pb in E-M1. 
So, Pb will first decrypt the message to get Da and then send rb to Pa in E-M3 
• Pa sends to Pb in E-M2: enc.k(Da)where k used is not the one sent to Pa in E-M1. So, Pb 
will not send E-M3 to Pa i.e. Pb will not send rb 
• Pa does not send E-M2 to Pb at all. So, Pb will not send E-M3 to Pa i.e. Pb will not send 
rb 
• Pa sends incorrect Da encrypted with ka. So, Pb will not send E-M3 to Pa i.e. Pb will not 
send rb 
• Pa sends incorrect Da encrypted with k i.e. incorrect key. So, Pb will not send E-M3 to 
Pa i.e. Pb will not send rb 
 
All scenarios of E-M3 will be studied as follows. 
 
• Pb sends correct rb. So, Pa will use it to decrypt Pb’s document and the exchange 
protocol will be completed fairly. 
• Pb sends incorrect rb. So, Pa will contact the STTP to recover rb. 
• Pb did not send rb at all i.e. Pb received correct E-M2 but did not send E-M3. So, Pa 
will contact the STTP to recover rb. 
 
Therefore, from the previous scenarios it is clear that the fairness is ensued for both Pa and Pb 
either through the exchange phase of the protocol or through the dispute resolution phase. 
 
All scenarios of DR-M1 will be studied as follows. 
 
• Pa sends correct DR-M1 to STTP. So, STTP will make the necessary verifications (i.e. 
verifications discussed in section 3.5) then STTP will send DR-M2 to Pb and DR-M3 
to Pa 
• Pa sends incorrect DR-M1 to STTP. So, STTP will make the necessary verifications 
(i.e. verifications discussed in section 3.5) then STTP will send an abort message to Pa. 
 
Therefore, if Pb misbehaves by not sending E-M3 or by sending incorrect E-M3 then the 
fairness can be ensured by allowing Pa to send a correct DR-M1 to STTP. STTP will then 
ensure fairness for both Pb and Pa by sending DR-M2 and DR-M3, respectively.  
 
If Pa misbehaves by contacting STTP (i.e. by sending DR-M1) after receiving E-M1 i.e. before 
sending E-M2 to Pb, then STTP will verify Pa’s request. If STTP finds that DR-M1 is not 
correct then STTP will reject Pa’s request. If however STTP finds that DR-M1 is correct then 
STTP will send DR-M2 to Pb and DR-M3 to Pa to ensure fairness for both parties. Therefore, 
Pa will not gain any advantage over Pb. 
 
STTP is not able to get the documents Da and Db because an encrypted Da will be sent to it in 
DR-M1. STTP does not have the key to decrypt it. Rather, STTP will use it to verify if Pa sent 
what Pb is looking for. Db is not sent to STTP at all. Therefore, STTP will not be able to get Da 
and Db. Hence, it is Semi Trusted Third Party. 
 
Non-repudiation can be assured in the proposed protocol by having the signatures of parties Pb 
and Pa on their items to be included in messages E-M1 and E-M2. 
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5. COMPARISONS 
In this section, the proposed protocol will be compared against the relevant protocols in the 
literature. That is, the proposed protocol will be compared against protocols in the literature, 
which are for the exchange of two documents (two documents or a document and payment) 
and involve an off-line or on-line TTP or STTP. The proposed protocol will be compared 
against Zhang et al protocol [12], Ray et al protocol [7], Alaraj and Munro protocol [1]. 
 
The protocols will be compared against the following criteria: number of messages in the 
exchange phase, number of messages in dispute phase, number of encryptions and decryptions 
in the exchange phase, number of symmetric encryptions in the exchange phase, and whether 
both parties involved in dispute resolution phase i.e. does the STTP need to contact both 
parties to verify the dispute request. 
  
The number of messages in the exchange phase of ECH protocol and our protocol is 3 whereas 
it is 4 messages in both Zhang and Ray protocols. The number of messages in the dispute 
resolution phase is almost the same for all protocols. The number of RSA encryptions and 
decryptions for our protocol is 13 whereas it is 16 for Zhang et al protocol [12]. This shows 
how the idea of enforcing the honesty of one party introduced in ECH protocol helped in 
reducing the number of messages and the number of RSA encryptions and decryptions of 
Zhang et al protocol [12]. The application of enforcing the honesty of a party to Zhang et al 
protocol [12] is the main focus of this paper. 
 
It is worth mentioning that Zhang et al’s protocol [12] is better in that it does not require the 
document of party Pa to be sent to the STTP in the dispute resolution phase whereas our 
protocol requires the party Pa to send its encrypted document “enc.ka(Da)” to the STTP in the 
dispute resolution phase. However, this does not mean that the STTP will be able to decrypt 
the document because STTP does not have the key ka. Rather, it uses it for the verification 
purposes. 
 
Table 1 presents all the comparisons between our protocol and other relevant protocols in the 
literature. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison between our protocol and other protocols 
 Zhang 
[12] 
Ray 
[7] 
ECH 
[1] 
Our 
Protocol 
Number of messages in exchange 
phase 
4 4 3 3 
Number of messages in dispute phase 3 3 to 
5 
3 3 
Number of RSA encryptions and 
decryptions in exchange phase 
16 27 12 13 
Number of symmetric encryptions and 
decryptions in exchange phase 
4 0 4 4 
Both parties are involved 
in dispute resolution 
No Yes No  No  
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6. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed an improved protocol for fairly exchanging two valuable documents 
between two parties. The proposed protocol uses offline Semi Trusted Third Party (STTP) that 
will only be contacted if one party misbehaved. The protocol is based on applying the idea of 
enforcing the honesty of one party to the method of verifiable and recoverable encryption of 
keys. The outcome of this application is a more efficient fair document exchange protocol. 
Only three messages are required to exchange the valuable documents between the two parties. 
Additionally, the number of modular exponentiations is less in our protocol compared to the 
protocols based on verifiable and recoverable encryption of keys. 
A future work will include formally evaluating the protocol and implementing it. 
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